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83 
FILLING THE CALIFORNIA NINTH 
CIRCUIT VACANCIES 
CARL TOBIAS* 
INTRODUCTION 
At President Donald Trump’s inauguration, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit faced ample vacancies that the United States 
Courts’ Administrative Office labeled “judicial emergencies” because of 
their protracted length and its huge caseload. Recent departures by Circuit 
Judge Stephen Reinhardt and former Chief Judge Alex Kozinski, who 
occupied California posts, and other jurists’ decision to change their active 
status mean that the circuit has five emergencies, three in California, because 
Trump has appointed only three nominees. The court also resolves the most 
filings least expeditiously. 
Limited clarity about whether more judges will leave active service 
over Trump’s presidency suggests that additional confirmations may be 
necessary; however, the selection process’s stunning politicization will 
compromise this initiative. For example, when the tribunal enjoined Trump’s 
controversial determinations which excluded immigrants from seven 
predominately Muslim nations, he excoriated multiple jurists of the circuit. 
Trump afforded numerous candidates, but merely three have received 
approval, partly because home state Democratic politicians retained “blue 
slips” when the White House minimally consulted. The vacancies—which 
exceed seventeen percent, and three California openings, which are ten—
show the crucial need to fill more vacancies. 
This piece first analyzes the vacancy conundrum’s history. It evaluates 
selection throughout the presidencies of Barack Obama and Trump, while 
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scrutinizing California’s pressing situation. Ascertaining that the 
predicament comes from reduced Democratic and Republican cooperation 
and some jurists’ departures, this Article reviews that complication’s impacts 
and detects that systematic partisanship has subverted confirmations, 
attributes which Trump could exacerbate. Because the plentiful vacancies 
injure myriad litigants by eroding judicial resources to decide lawsuits, the 
final Part proffers solutions for the President and the Senate to promptly fill 
the California openings. 
I. MODERN SELECTION DIFFICULTIES 
The history warrants little treatment here, as others have canvassed the 
background,1 and the current standoff enjoys greatest relevance. One aspect 
is the permanent difficulty that results from enhanced federal jurisdiction, 
cases and judges.2 Significant now is the modern concern, which is political 
and emanates from contrasting Senate and presidential control that started 
four decades ago.3 Both constituents have affected California. For instance, 
rampant population growth driven by rising financial expansion and 
immigration enlarged district cases with related appeals; thus, circuit seats 
increased to twenty-eight in 1984.4 Mounting partisanship also undermined 
confirmations by slowing and halting nominees.5 However, certain 
phenomena tempered appointments problems. Over most of the Ninth 
Circuit’s 128 years, it faced nominal difficulties. The judicial complement 
was extremely small, openings were rare, and the chamber easily filled many 
positions. Indeed, until 1968, the tribunal performed efficaciously with 
merely nine members. 
 
 1. MILLER CTR. COMM’N NO. 7, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON SELECTING FEDERAL JUDGES 
3–6 (1996); Gordon Bermant et al., Judicial Vacancies: An Examination of the Problem and Possible 
Solutions, 14 MISS. C. L. REV. 319, 320–33 (1994). California has fourteen active Ninth Circuit 
judgeships. 
 2. It needs less scrutiny; some delay is intrinsic, resists meaningful change and has been analyzed. 
Carl Tobias, Combating the Ninth Circuit Judicial Vacancy Crisis, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 687, 
689–91 (2017). 
 3. Some periods, as 2017 to 2018, have one-party control. For fuller treatment, see generally 
MILLER CTR. COMM’N, supra note 1; Bermant, supra note 1, and Tobias, Combating Ninth Circuit 
Vacancies, supra note 2. 
 4. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 95-486, 92 Stat. 1629 (1978) (increasing the number of circuit and district 
court judgeships); Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 345 (1984) (same); Pub. L. No. 110-177 §509, 121 Stat. 
2534, 2543 (2008) (transferring a D.C. Circuit judgeship to the Ninth Circuit and bringing the Ninth 
Circuit judgeships to 29). 
 5. That partisanship was incremental, declining after Judge Robert Bork’s monumental Supreme 
Court battle. However, even later, some cooperation occurred. See discussion infra notes 7–9, 12. See 
generally CHARLES GEYH, WHEN COURTS AND CONGRESS COLLIDE: THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF 
AMERICA’S JUDICIAL SYSTEM (2007) (discussing the relationship between Congress and the federal 
courts). 
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A 1978 statute authorized manifold posts, while President Jimmy Carter 
had success, primarily because Democrats held the upper chamber, so 
President Ronald Reagan had no vacancy upon election.6 He quickly 
confirmed jurists, although five positions were created, as the GOP had the 
chamber Reagan’s initial six years and once Democrats became the majority 
they coordinated.7 Senator Joe Biden (D-Del.), the able Judiciary Committee 
Chair, astutely canvassed nominees, and the majority confirmed Justice 
Anthony Kennedy and six circuit jurists across the U.S.  over 1988, yet three 
posts, two located in California, were open upon year’s end.8 Smooth 
appointments prevailed for most of George H.W. Bush’s time but slowed in 
1992, meaning that a California appellate position was empty.9 
President Bill Clinton appointed a judge for this slot partially because 
Democrats acquired a majority in his first half term, but Republicans 
recaptured Senate control during 1995. At various later times, openings 
reached ten, including three California posts with his tenure’s end.10 This 
situation improved over George W. Bush’s presidency, especially when the 
GOP enjoyed a majority. He approved several jurists primarily by consulting 
Democrats; yet controversy arose, leaving a sole vacancy at his time’s 
close.11 
In short, judicial appointments were mixed, but certain periods allowed 
relatively successful endeavors. Illustrations were Bush père and son; yet 
circumstances gradually deteriorated after United States Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia Circuit Judge Robert Bork’s confirmation fight 
for the Supreme Court until 2009 when they markedly declined.12 
 
 6. See U.S. CTS., VACANCIES IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: AUGUST 1, 1981, at 4 (1981); see also 
SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES: LOWER COURT SELECTION FROM ROOSEVELT 
THROUGH REAGAN 285–345 (1997). 
 7. See 143 CONG. REC. S2,541 (daily ed. Mar., 19, 1997) (statement of Sen. Biden); see also 
GOLDMAN, supra note 6, at 285–345.   
 8. See U.S. CTS., VACANCIES IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (ARTICLE III JUDGES ONLY): 
NOVEMBER 1, 1988, at 3 (1988). Bork was an exception to collegial selection.  
 9. U.S. CTS., VACANCIES IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY ARTICLE III JUDGES ONLY): NOVEMBER 1, 
1993, at 3 (1993).  
 10. Clinton’s naming fine centrists and a few GOP senators’ help meant that some states 
functioned well. See generally U.S. CTS., VACANCIES IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY ARTICLE III JUDGES 
ONLY): NOVEMBER 1, 1995; U.S. CTS., VACANCIES IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY ARTICLE III JUDGES 
ONLY): NOVEMBER 1, 2000. 
 11.  See generally U.S. CTS., VACANCIES IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY ARTICLE III JUDGES ONLY): 
NOVEMBER 1, 2007; U.S. CTS., VACANCIES IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY ARTICLE III JUDGES ONLY): 
NOVEMBER 1, 2008 (confirming ten 2007 to 2008 George W. Bush circuit picks); S. Judiciary Comm., 
Exec. Business Mtg. (Feb. 15, 2018) (evaluating a California-Idaho dispute over which state would fill 
Judge Stephen Trott’s vacancy). 
 12. E.g., MARK GITENSTEIN, MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE: AN INSIDER’S ACCOUNT OF AMERICA’S 
REJECTION OF ROBERT BORK’S NOMINATION TO THE SUPREME COURT 11–12 (1992); JEFFREY TOOBIN, 
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II. OBAMA ADMINISTRATION SELECTION 
The practices worked rather effectively across Obama’s initial six years 
when Democrats had a chamber majority. He actively consulted home state 
Republicans, seeking, and normally following, proposals of capable, 
mainstream nominees.13 Those initiatives encouraged cooperation in the 
early Obama era because senators received deference, as they may slow the 
process through keeping blue slips, which the Senate respected in Obama’s 
tenure.14 Even with Obama’s assertive pleading, some did not coordinate by 
forwarding accomplished prospects.15 
The GOP collaborated with regular hearings but “held over” 
discussions and votes a week for all except one circuit nominee.16 
Republicans slowly allowed chamber debates, if required, and ballots, 
forcing strong centrists to languish months until Democrats pursued 
cloture.17 The GOP also sought plenty of roll call votes and debate hours on 
capable, moderate aspirants, who felicitously captured approval, thus 
consuming rare floor time.18 This left some Ninth Circuit vacancies across 
Obama’s initial half decade; yet he appointed several preeminent, consensus, 
diverse judges the first three years.19 
 
THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT 18 n.14 (2007). See generally GEYH, 
supra note 5.  
 13. Carl Tobias, Senate Gridlock and Federal Judicial Selection, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2233, 
2239–40, 2253 (2013); see also Sheldon Goldman et al., Obama’s First Term Judiciary, 97 JUDICATURE 
7, 8–17 (2013). 
 14. No nominee moved without two slips. Carl Tobias, Senate Blue Slips and Senate Regular 
Order, YALE L. & POL’Y REV. INTER ALIA (Nov. 20, 2018). But see discussion infra notes 78–83 and 
accompanying text.  
 15. Some sent none. Goldman et al., supra note 13, at 17; see also 161 CONG. REC. S6,151 (daily 
ed. July 30, 2015).  
 16. S. Judiciary Comm., Exec. Business Mtg. (Mar. 22, 2013); see also Tobias, supra note 13, at 
2242–43.  
 17. I depend below on Goldman et al., supra note 13, at 26–29; Tobias, supra note 13, at 2243–
46. 
 18. Tobias, supra note 13, at 2244; see also Juan Williams, The GOP’s Judicial Logjam, HILL 
(July 27, 2015), https://thehill.com/opinion/juan-williams/249196-juan-williams-the-gops-judicial-
logjam. 
 19. Judicial Vacancy List for December 2009, U.S. CTS, https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-
judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies/2009/12/vacancies/html (last visited Feb. 18, 
2019); Judicial Vacancy List for December 2014, U.S. CTS, https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-
judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies/2014/12/vacancies/html (last visited Feb. 18, 
2019); see also 156 CONG. REC. S4,608 (daily ed. June 7, 2010) (discussing and confirming judicial 
nominee Lucy Koh); id. at S10,986 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 2010) (discussing and confirming judicial nominee 
Mary Murguia); 157 CONG. REC. S8,625 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 2011) (discussing and confirming judicial 
nominee Morgan Christen).  
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In the 2012 presidential election year, Republicans coordinated less.20 
Delay increased, while appellate confirmations ended in June.21 Upon 
Obama’s reelection, Democrats hoped for improved collaboration, but 
recalcitrance expanded in 2013 when he proffered three fine, mainstream, 
diverse nominees for the D.C. Circuit, the nation’s second most important 
tribunal.22 Republicans provided them no Senate ballots, and protracted 
obstruction made Democrats unleash the “nuclear option” which confined 
filibusters, allowing the Ninth Circuit to have every seat filled at 2014’s 
conclusion.23 
The following year, once Republicans held a Senate majority,24 already 
negligible cooperation decreased. GOP leaders promised to reinstitute 
“regular order,” the approach which governed before Democrats ostensibly 
eroded this. In January, Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.), the new Majority Leader, 
stated, we must “return to regular order.”25 Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa), the 
Judiciary Chair, pledged that he would similarly assess prospects.26 Despite 
incessant vows, Republicans slowly offered Obama picks hearings and 
committee votes and chamber debates and ballots. With 2015’s close, these 
phenomena meant that eight appellate emergencies lacked nominees for 
states which GOP senators represented, and California had one, when Harry 
Pregerson took senior status that December.27 
 
 20. Tobias, supra note 13, at 2246; Russell Wheeler, The ‘Thurmond Rule’ and Other Advice and 
Consent Myths, BROOKINGS INST. (May 25, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2016/05/25 
/the-thurmond-rule-and-other-advice-and-consent-myths; Michael Shear et al., Obama Pick Opens Court 
Battle, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2016, at A1; see also S. Judiciary Comm., Exec. Business Mtg. (Mar. 17, 
2016) (statement of Sen. Leahy); S. Judiciary Comm., Exec. Business Mtg. (May. 19, 2016) (statement 
of Sen. Grassley); Carl Tobias, Confirming Circuit Judges in a Presidential Election Year, 84 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. ARGUENDO 160, 169 (2016). 
 21. 158 CONG. REC. S4,108 (daily ed. June 12, 2012) (elevating Andrew Hurwitz). Jacqueline 
Nguyen and Paul Watford won 2012 approval to California seats. Id. at S2,931 (daily ed. May 14, 2012); 
id. at S3,388 (daily ed. May 21, 2012). 
 22. See generally Carl Tobias, Filling the D.C. Circuit Vacancies, 91 IND. L.J. 121 (2015) 
(discussing the filling of three D.C. Circuit vacancies at this time). 
 23. John Owens and Michelle Friedland won approval to California seats. 160 CONG. REC. S1,881 
(daily ed. Mar. 31, 2014); id. at S2,426 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 2014).  
 24. Jerry Markon et al., Republicans Win Senate Control as Polls Show Dissatisfaction with 
Obama, WASH. POST (Nov. 4, 2014), http://wapo.st/1rZ20TB?tid=ss_tw&utm_term=.d7667ffae95a; 
Jonathan Weisman, G.O.P. Takes Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2014, at A1. 
 25. He repeats the mantra. 161 CONG. REC. S27 (daily ed. Jan. 7, 2015); id. at S2,767 (daily ed. 
May 12, 2015).  
 26. S. Judiciary Comm., Hearing on Nominees (Jan. 21, 2015). 
 27. They helped little, so Obama sent no 2015 nominee. See Judicial Emergencies for December 
2015, U.S. CTS, https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-
vacancies/2015/12/emergencies (last visited Feb. 18, 2019); Judicial Emergencies for December 2016, 
U.S. CTS, https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies 
/2016/12/emergencies (last visited Feb. 18, 2019). 
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In Obama’s last half term, the chamber promptly approved Kara 
Farnandez Stoll, an expert, moderate lawyer, but slowly confirmed District 
Judge Felipe Restrepo, a prominent centrist, to the Federal and Third 
Circuits.28 Appointing so few jurists over two years was nearly 
unprecedented.29 In 2016—a presidential election year when circuit 
approvals conventionally halt early—GOP denial of review to Judge Merrick 
Garland, Obama’s exceptional Supreme Court nominee,30 intensified these 
attributes. Despite the tradition ensuring that preeminent, mainstream 
nominees receive floor ballots after May, this did not materialize.31 Obama 
nominated seven well qualified, moderate candidates—including District 
Judge Lucy Koh for the California opening—yet none realized 
appointment.32 
Judge Koh merits emphasis because she possesses superb abilities, 
deserved prior confirmation, and warrants Ninth Circuit renomination, and 
California Democratic Senators Dianne Feinstein and Kamala Harris 
powerfully favor her elevation.33 The judge is distinctly qualified.34 She was 
the initial Asian American on the Northern District of California 35 and has 
carefully resolved major litigation, including her effective disposition of 
 
 28. Carl Tobias, Confirming Judge Restrepo to the Third Circuit, 88 TEMPLE L. REV. ONLINE 37, 
38 n.4, 45–46 (2017).  
 29. Chris Kang, GOP Obstruction Could Be Worst Since the 1800s, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 20, 
2016), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/christopher-kang/republican-obstruction-of_b_9741446.html; 
see also discussion supra notes 8, 11 and accompanying text. 
 30. Wheeler, supra note 20; Shear et al., supra note 20, at A1. 
 31. Tobias, Confirming Circuit Judges in a Presidential Election Year, supra note 20, at 169; see 
also S. Judiciary Comm., Exec. Business Mtg. (Mar. 17, 2016) (statement of Sen. Leahy); S. Judiciary 
Comm., Exec. Business Mtg. (May. 19, 2016) (statement of Sen. Grassley). 
 32. See generally Carl Tobias, Confirm Judge Koh to the Ninth Circuit, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
449 (2016); Tobias, supra note 31.  
 33. Emily Cadei, Dianne Feinstein, Kamala Harris Try to Cut a Deal with Trump, SACRAMENTO 
BEE (May 22, 2018), https://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/capitol-alert 
/article211603954.html; Zoe Tillman, Here’s How Trump Is Trying to Remake His Least Favorite Court, 
BUZZFEED NEWS (Mar. 15, 2018), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/zoetillman/heres-who-the-
white-house-pitched-for-the-federal-appeals; see also Letter from Sen. Dianne Feinstein to Donald 
McGahn, White House Counsel (Oct. 5, 2018), https://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/_cache/files 
/d/4/d4757388-8ebc-446c-8283-1719f1054d60/C0422EA4863812AFB2A2BEF78E242426.2018.10.5-
df-letter-to-mcgahn-re.-ninth-circuit.pdf.  
 34. She was a well-respected prosecutor, law firm partner, and Superior Court and Northern 
District of California judge, earning an excellent reputation since 2010. For these ideas and more, see 
Tobias, supra note 32, at 450.  
 35. Bob Egelko, Lucy Koh Nominated for U.S. Court of Appeals in S.F., S.F. GATE (Feb. 25, 2016), 
https://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Obama-nominates-local-judge-to-federal-appeals-6855113.php; 
Howard Mintz, San Jose Judge Lucy Koh Nominated to Federal Appeals Court, MERCURY NEWS (Feb. 
25, 2016), https://www.mercurynews.com/2016/02/25/san-jose-judge-lucy-koh-nominated-to-federal-
appeals-court. 
  
2019] FILLING THE CALIFORNIA NINTH CIRCUIT VACANCIES 89 
Apple’s patent infringement case against Samsung.36 The nominee earned a 
well-qualified rating from a substantial majority of the American Bar 
Association (“ABA”) evaluation committee.37 
Accordingly, Koh was a dynamic pick who merited appointment, while 
she resembles many fine Obama confirmees who afford benefits. Circuits 
with all their jurists can rapidly, economically, and fairly treat huge 
caseloads.38 Increased ethnic, gender, and sexual orientation diversity 
improves comprehension and resolution of critical questions which tribunals 
decide.39 Minority judges also curtail prejudices that undermine justice, and 
they instill public confidence.40 
Selection and election year politics should not have undercut Koh’s 
review. Koh is a district jurist, which speeds the process; her ABA and FBI 
analyses only required updating; she was confirmed once and compiled a 
long, accessible record.41 The panel fully investigated her by cooperating 
with the ABA, FBI, and Department of Justice (“DOJ”).42 The Chair only set 
a hearing five months after nomination, although the Ninth Circuit required 
all posts filled.43 Feinstein and Barbara Boxer (D-Cal.) introduced Koh, 
praising her as the classic “American success story.”44 Members robustly 
queried the nominee who duly responded.45 Koh appeared to satisfy most. A 
few next posited written questions that she promptly answered.46 Grassley 
 
 36. Apple v. Samsung, No. 11–CV–01846–LHK, 2011 WL 7036077 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2011); see 
also In re High-Tech Emp. Antitrust Litig., 856 F. Supp. 2d 1103 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (settling ably 3000 
workers’ antitrust claims).  
 37. See generally ABA STANDING COMM. ON THE FED. JUDICIARY, RATINGS OF ARTICLE III AND 
ARTICLE IV JUDICIAL NOMINEES: 114TH CONGRESS (2017). 
 38. 160 CONG. REC. S5,364 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2014) (statement of Sen. Leahy); Tobias, Senate 
Gridlock and Federal Judicial Selection, supra note 13, at 2239, 2254. 
 39. They resolve cases that involve critical issues like civil rights and abortion. For additional 
discussion on these issues, see SALLY KENNEY, GENDER AND JUSTICE: WHY WOMEN IN THE JUDICIARY 
REALLY MATTER (2013); FRANK WU, YELLOW: RACE IN AMERICA BEYOND BLACK AND WHITE (2003). 
But see Stephen Choi et al., Judging Women, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 504 (2011). 
 40. REPORT, FIRST CIRCUIT GENDER, RACE AND ETHNIC BIAS TASK FORCES (1999); Sylvia Lazos, 
Only Skin Deep?: The Cost of Partisan Politics on Minority Diversity of the Federal Bench, 83 IND. L.J. 
1423, 1442 (2008); Tobias, supra note 13, at 2249.  
 41. Tobias, Senate Gridlock and Federal Judicial Selection, supra note 13, at 2258; see also 
discussion supra note 36 and accompanying text for more on Koh’s qualifications. 
 42. Koh had been vetted, so evaluation was brief. See Egelko, supra note 35; Mintz, supra note 
35. 
 43. See supra notes 8, 29 and accompanying text. He also needed to reciprocate for Democrats’ 
appointing ten circuit judges, one to an Idaho seat, in Bush’s last two years.   
 44. S. Judiciary Comm., Hearing on Nominees (July 13, 2016).  
 45. John Cornyn (R-Tex.) asked why she “effectively invalidated the Electronic Privacy Act.” Id.; 
In re Google Inc. Gmail Litigation, No. 13–MD–02430–LHK, 2014 WL 1102660 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 
2014). Her circuit lacked precedent, so she consulted other cases.  
 46. Hearing, supra note 44. Most were uncontroversial; her responses were careful.  
  
90      SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW POSTSCRIPT [Vol. 92:PS83 
convened a September panel debate 47 where the members rigorously 
discussed the nominee.48 Four Republicans, including Grassley, favored 
Koh, who earned approval.49 
Many ideas show why she deserved rapid appointment. The GOP leader 
had a duty to follow the regular order that he always lauds and distinctly 
relevant Bush precedent.50 McConnell had numerous weeks to vote on Koh 
but refused once Trump captured the presidency.51 Excellent centrists 
usually attain final ballots, so her proponents should have pursued cloture 
and senators who honor custom must have agreed.52 When Koh reached the 
floor, the leader ought to have arranged a respectful debate, which robustly 
canvassed many questions, and a chamber vote. In short, Republican 
obstruction meant that Koh lacked a final ballot and her nomination expired 
in early 2017.53 
III. TRUMP ADMINISTRATION SELECTION 
A. NOMINATION PROCESS 
Over the campaign, Trump promised to name and seat ideological 
conservatives and kept the vows by sending and confirming Neil Gorsuch 
and Brett Kavanaugh and manifold similar circuit and certain district 
nominees.54 He created records for appointing circuit jurists the initial year 
 
 47. The GOP held over Koh like most nominees. S. Judiciary Comm., Exec. Business Mtg. (Sept. 
8, 2016); S. Judiciary Comm., Exec. Business Mtg. (Mar. 22, 2013); see also Tobias, supra note 13, at 
2242–43.  
 48. Cornyn based opposition on the Google opinion. S. Judiciary Comm., Exec. Business Mtg. 
(Sept. 15, 2016); see supra note 45 for further discussion.  
 49. S. Judiciary Comm., Exec. Business Mtg. (Sept. 15, 2016). Obama-elevated judges—whom 
Judge Nguyen typifies—easily won panel votes, as they had captured them and appointment once. S. 
Judiciary Comm., Exec. Business Mtg. (Dec. 1, 2011); see supra note 21 for further discussion.  
 50. Tobias, Confirm Judge Koh to the Ninth Circuit, supra note 32, at 454, 455 n.29 (urging regular 
order and confirmation of 2008 Bush nominees).  
 51. Tobias, Confirming Circuit Judges in a Presidential Election Year, supra note 31; see also 162 
CONG. REC. S5,312 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 2016) (denying Obama nominees floor votes). Many GOP senators 
opposed any Supreme Court choice; few opposed Koh. Ted Cruz, The Scalia Seat: Let the People Speak, 
WALL ST. J. (Mar. 6, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-scalia-seat-let-the-people-speak-
1457307358. 
 52. Tobias, Confirm Judge Koh to the Ninth Circuit, supra note 32, at 457 nn.36–41; see also 
supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 53. 162 CONG. REC. S7,183 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 2017).  
 54. Carl Tobias, Confirming Justices in a Presidential Election Year, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 1093, 
1103 (2017); Judicial Vacancy List for December 2017, U.S. CTS, https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-
judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies/2017/12/vacancies (last visited Feb. 18, 2019); 
Judicial Vacancy List for December 2018, U.S. CTS, https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-
judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies/2018/12/vacancies (last visited Feb. 18, 2019); 
Amber Phillips, Another Big Mitch McConnell Supreme Court Gamble Looks Set to Pay Off, WASH. 
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with a dozen and eighteen the next but has tapped eight Ninth Circuit picks 
and only three won confirmation.55 
Trump applies some customs, yet discards, reverses or deemphasizes 
others. For instance, he, like modern predecessors, assigned lead nomination 
efforts to the White House Counsel, located related duties in DOJ and 
stressed circuit openings.56 When proffering appellate nominees, former 
White House Counsel McGahn emphasized conservative perspectives and 
youth. The Counsel relied on litmus tests, including opposition to the 
administrative state, and proposed aspirants in their forties, while he often 
used the list of twenty-five potential Supreme Court picks whom the 
Federalist Society and Heritage Foundation assembled.57 Those procedures 
continue applying because the Society’s Executive Vice President, Leonard 
Leo, advises Trump on selection.58 The White House stresses the circuits, as 
they comprise tribunals of last resort for virtually all cases, announce greater 
policy than district courts  and issue rulings which cover multiple states.59 
However, Trump omits and downplays myriad traditions. Crucial is 
failing to assiduously consult home state politicians, an effective convention 
 
POST (Oct. 4, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2018/10/04/another-big-mitch-
mcconnell-supreme-court-gamble-looks-set-pay-off/?.  
 55. (Judicial Confirmations for December 2009, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-
judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies 
/2009/12/confirmations/html (last visited Feb. 18, 2019); Judicial Confirmations for December 2017, 
U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies 
/2017/12/confirmations (last visited Feb. 18, 2019); Judicial Confirmations for December 2018, U.S. 
CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies 
/201/12/confirmations (last visited Feb. 18, 2019); for further discussion see infra notes 67–68, 87–88. I 
rely below on Jason Zengerle, Bench Warfare, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2018, at SM30. 
 56. Tobias, Senate Gridlock and Federal Judicial Selection, supra note 13, at 2240; Robert Costa, 
McGahn’s Last Stand, WASH. POST (Oct. 4, 2018), https://wapo.st/2RoSiiY?tid=ss_tw&utm 
_term=.c4cbd464d2de; see also Michael Schmidt & Maggie Haberman, Lawyer for President Steps 
Down, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2018, at A13. 
 57. Jeremy Peters, Trump’s New Judicial Litmus Test: Shrinking the ‘Administrative State’, N.Y. 
TIMES (March 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/26/us/politics/trump-judges-courts-
administrative-state.html; Charlie Savage, Courts Reshaped at Fastest Pace in 5 Decades, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 12, 2017, at A1; see also infra note 77 for further discussion.  
 58. Zoe Tillman, After Eight Years on the Sidelines, This Conservative Group Is Primed to 
Reshape the Courts Under Trump, BUZZFEED NEWS (Nov. 20, 2017), https://www.buzzfeednews.com 
/article/zoetillman/after-eight-years-on-the-sidelines-this-conservative-group. For more discussion of 
Leo’s impact, see Richard Patterson, The Man Behind Trump’s Judicial Nominees, BOSTON GLOBE (Sept. 
16, 2018), https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2018/09/06/the-man-behind-trump-conservative-
judicial-nominees/bJOU7yNNHSGKkcSEXbb4KM/story.html. 
 59. Tobias, Senate Gridlock and Federal Judicial Selection, supra note 13, at 2240–41; Joan 
Biskupic, Trump Fast-Tracks Appeals Judges, but Lags on Lower Courts, CNN (May 25, 2018), 
https://www.cnn.com/2018/05/25/politics/appeals-district-court-trump/index.html.  
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which Presidents use that is a critical reason for blue slips.60 Peculiarly 
relevant are the conflicting approaches deployed when filling two Ninth 
Circuit vacancies. McGahn suggested, and Trump nominated, Ryan Bounds 
without consulting Oregon Democratic Senators Ron Wyden and Jeff 
Merkley or allowing invocation of a bipartisan selection committee, 
provoking slips’ aggressive retention.61 In profound contrast, McGahn avidly 
consulted Hawaii Democratic Senators Mazie Hirono and Brian Schatz prior 
to sending Mark Bennett, prompting their full support of him and praise for 
McGahn’s endeavors in a smooth hearing and Bennett’s quick approval.62 
A related abandonment of efficacious precedent is the ABA’s nearly 
complete exclusion from judicial selection. All Presidents after Dwight 
Eisenhower, save George W. Bush, had employed ABA ratings when 
proposing candidates, and Obama eschewed candidates whom the ABA 
ranked not qualified.63 However, Trump nominated six prospects with this 
rating.64 
He also deletes or ignores effective tools. One is not prioritizing 
nominations by initially filling eighty-seven emergency vacancies, which 
courts ground in their substantial length or caseloads;65 in fact, these 
emergency vacancies have multiplied since Republicans won the chamber.66 
 
 60. Thomas Kaplan, Trump Is Putting Indelible Stamp on Judiciary, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2018, at 
A15; Tillman, supra note 33.  
 61. Press Release, White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, President Donald Trump Announces 
Seventh Wave of Judicial Nominees (Sept. 7, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions 
/president-donald-j-trump-announces-seventh-wave-judicial-candidates; Letter from Donald McGahn, 
White House Counsel, to Sens. Ron Wyden & Jeff Merkley (Sept. 6, 2017), 
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/4042623/9-6-17-McGahn-Letter.pdf; Letter from Sens. Ron 
Wyden & Jeff Merkley to Don McGahn, White House Counsel (Sept. 7, 2017), http://static.politico.com 
/59/2a/f5b886e44d6ba505b1551125a32e/wh-judicial-vacancy-signed.pdf; see also infra notes 81–82, 90 
for more on later history.  
 62. Press Release, White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, President Donald Trump Announces 
Eleventh Wave of Judicial Nominees (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions 
/president-donald-j-trump-announces-eleventh-wave-judicial-nominees; see also S. Judiciary Comm., 
Hearing on Nominees (Apr. 11, 2018). For more on later history, see infra note 89.  
 63. 163 CONG. REC. S8,022, S8,024 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 2017) (statements of Sens. Leahy & 
Feinstein). 
 64. Ratings, 115th Cong., supra note 37. The GOP contested Steven Grasz’s rating, alleging that 
the ABA is a liberal interest group. See S. Judiciary Comm., Hearing on Nominees (Nov. 1, 2017); S. 
Judiciary Comm., Exec. Business Mtg. (Dec. 7, 2017); see also 163 CONG. REC. S7,965 (daily ed. Dec. 
12, 2017) (Grasz’s approval); Adam Liptak, White House Cuts A.B.A. Out of Judge Evaluations, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 1, 2017, at A16.  
 65. Judicial Emergencies for March 2019, U.S. CTS.,  https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-
judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies/2019/03/emergencies (last visited Mar. 11, 
2019) (showing that seven of eight circuit vacancies are emergencies).  
 66. They soared from twelve to eighty-seven. Id. (2019 Judicial Emergencies); Judicial 
Emergencies for December 2015, U.S. CTS.,  https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-
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Trump as well nominates fewer picks in states which Democrats represent, 
even though most have plentiful emergencies.67 California includes three 
Ninth Circuit emergencies, but Trump only named Patrick Bumatay, Daniel 
Collins and Kenneth Lee last October, although the senators opposed 
confirmation, favoring as nominees Collins, James Rogan and Koh; 
Bumatay, Collins and Lee received no 2018 hearing, saw their nominations 
expire and received renomination, with Bumatay receiving renomination to 
the Southern District of California and Daniel Bress receiving nomination to 
the Ninth Circuit.68 
Another useful idea, which Trump rejects or deemphasizes, is 
enhancing minority individuals’ bench representation, particularly vis-à-vis 
Democrats.69 For example, he seemingly effectuated no initiatives that 
suggest and confirm ethnic minority or lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, 
or queer (“LGBTQ”) prospects by assigning diverse staff to selection or 
urging that politicians send numerous minorities.70 Among Trump’s eighty-
 
vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies/2015/12/emergencies (last visited Feb. 19, 2019). But see Press 
Release, White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, President Donald Trump Nominates Tenth Wave of 
Judicial Nominees (Jan. 23, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/president-donald-j-
trump-announces-tenth-wave-judicial-nominees.  
 67. For more blue state nominees, see Press Release, White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, 
President Donald Trump Nominates Ninth Wave of Judicial Nominees (Dec. 20, 2017); Press Release, 
White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, President Donald Trump Nominates Fourteenth Wave of Judicial 
Nominees, May 10, 2018; Press Release, White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, President Donald 
Trump Nominates Sixteenth Wave of Judicial Nominees, July 13, 2018; Press Release, White House, 
Office of the Press Sec’y, President Donald Trump Nominates Eighteenth Wave of Judicial Nominees, 
Oct. 10, 2018. Data verify “red” state priority. Judicial Emergencies, U.S. CTS., 
https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/judicial-emergencies (last visited Feb. 
19, 2019).  
 68. When the White House issued a notice of intent to renominate fifty of the seventy-three 
candidates whose nominations expired on January 2, which excluded all three, the Wall Street Journal 
published an editorial that criticized the White House Counsel for negotiating with the California senators 
and urged prompt renomination. Editorial, A Bad Judges Deal, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 29, 2019), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-bad-judges-deal-11548807717. The editorial ignited a firestorm of 
criticism from conservative media that apparently triggered the renominations, leaving the situation 
unclear. Press Release, White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, President Donald Trump Announces His 
Intent to Nominate Judicial Nominees (Jan. 22, 2018); Press Release, White House, Office of the Press 
Sec’y, President Donald Trump Announces His Intent to Nominate Judicial Nominees (Jan. 30, 2018); 
Press Release, Feinstein, Harris on Ninth Circuit Nominees (Jan. 30, 2019); Eighteenth Wave, supra note 
67; Letter from Sen. Dianne Feinstein to Donald McGahn, supra note 33; 165 CONG. REC. S23 (daily ed. 
Jan. 2, 2018) (expired nominations). The nominees are lawyers. Rogan is a respected California Superior 
Court Judge.   
 69. Carl Tobias, President Donald Trump and Federal Bench Diversity, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
ONLINE 400 (2018); Michael Nelson & Rachel Hinkle, Trump Appoints Lots of White Men as Federal 
Judges. Here’s Why It Matters., WASH. POST (Mar. 13, 2018), http://wapo.st/2Hn6aUT?tid=ss_tw&utm 
_term=.e00c0046f478. 
 70. LGBTQ means “out” sexual orientation; it is possible that some may not have revealed theirs. 
LGBTQ people are considered “minorities” here. Jennifer Bendery, Trump Finally Has an LGBTQ 
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nine lower federal court confirmees, only Amul Thapar, James Ho, John 
Nalbandian, Neomi Rao, Karen Gren Scholer, Jill Otake, Fernando 
Rodriguez, and Terry Moorer are persons of color, and of 170 nominees, 
twenty-one are - the initial six confirmed, Bumatay, Lee, and five more 
constitute Asian Americans, while Rodriguez and two others are Latinos, 
Moorer and four more comprise African Americans, Bumatay is gay, and 
Mary Rowland is a lesbian.71 
McGahn consulted Feinstein and Harris somewhat respecting the three 
California appellate vacancies. Feinstein has marshaled astute panel service, 
operating collegially with GOP politicians, especially Grassley, and is now 
the Ranking Member.72 For example, she promoted controversial Bush 
circuit nominees, like Kavanaugh, who secured a panel vote, which should 
ingratiate her with Republicans, but they demonize Feinstein over his recent 
promotion. 
At Trump’s election and for much of 2017, California had one vacancy; 
yet the Kozinski and Reinhardt departures left it with three, changing the 
dynamics.73 In Trump’s first year, Feinstein held productive selection 
meetings with Mike Pence and the White House Counsel, Donald McGahn.74 
 
Judicial Nominee, HUFFINGTON POST (June 7, 2018), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/trump-
lesbian-judicial-nominee-mary-rowland_us_5b19b351e4b09d7a3d708461.  
 71. For confirmees, see Judicial Confirmations for December 2017, U.S. CTS.,  
https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies/2017/12 
/confirmations (last visited Feb. 19, 2019); Judicial Confirmations for December 2018, U.S. CTS., 
https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies/2018/12 
/confirmations (last visited Feb. 19, 2019). For nominees, see Seventh Wave, supra note 61; Tenth Wave, 
supra note 66; 4 Waves, supra note 67; Press Release, White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, President 
Donald Trump Nominates Twelfth Wave of Judicial Nominees (Apr. 10, 2018); Press Release, White 
House, Office of the Press Sec’y, President Donald Trump Nominates Thirteenth Wave of Judicial 
Nominees (Apr. 26, 2018); Press Release, White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, President Donald 
Trump Nominates Fifteenth Wave of Judicial Nominees (June 7, 2018). 
 72. Michael Doyle, What’s Ahead for West’s Liberal Appeals Court, Once Trump Takes Over?, 
SACRAMENTO BEE (Nov. 23, 2016), https://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government 
/article116777848.html?utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=amp&utm_source=www.sacbee.com-
RelayMediaAMP; see Sarah Wire, Is Trump Finally Ready To Turn His Sights Toward Remaking the 
Ninth Circuit?, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2018), https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-ninth-circuit-
vacancies-20180815-story 
.html. 
 73. Maura Dolan, Ninth Circuit Judge Alex Kozinski Steps Down After Allegations of Sexual 
Misconduct, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2017), https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-judge-alex-
kozinski-20171218-story.html; Noah Feldman, The 9th Circuit Court Battle Falls Silent, 
BLOOMBERGVIEW (Apr. 2, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-04-02/stephen-
reinhardt-alex-kozinski-and-the-battle-for-9th-circuit; Carl Hulse, Judge’s Death Gives Trump a Chance 
to Remake a Vexing Court, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2018, at A13.  
 74. Seung Min Kim, Trump Has Not Taken Aim at the Court That Annoys Him Most, WASH. POST 
(May 6, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-is-transforming-the-judiciary-but-he-
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In August 2017, a source claimed that McGahn had analyzed twenty-five 
people to fill the California vacancy and offered the senators “possible 
nominees;”75 while in 2018, outlets said that Feinstein’s panel had reviewed 
several Trump picks and some candidates whom it first vetted.76 Despite 
much press coverage of the two newer California vacancies and speculation 
proclaiming how Trump might remake the circuit, he named Bumatay, 
Collins, and Lee in late 2018, notwithstanding the senators’ opposition and 
concerted efforts to reach a deal by proffering Collins, Rogan, and Koh.77 
B. CONFIRMATION PROCESS 
The appointments process resembled the nomination system’s 
detrimental features in certain ways by omitting, altering or diluting effective 
customs or mechanisms. Instructive examples were changing (1) the 100-
year-old blue slip procedure—which denies nominee consideration when 
politicians retain slips—and (2) valuable committee duties. 
In fall 2017, Grassley amended the slip policy for circuit nominees by 
processing aspirants without two home state politicians’ slips, particularly 
 
has-yet-to-take-aim-at-the-court-that-annoys-him-most/2018/05/06/53886d30-4f9d-11e8-b966-
bfb0da2dad62_story.html;  Zoe Tillman, Why Trump Must Work with the Senate, Including Democratic 
Senators, To Confirm His Judges, BUZZFEED NEWS (Mar. 31, 2017), https://www.buzzfeednews.com 
/article/zoetillman/why-trump-will-have-to-work-with-democrats-to-get-his. 
 75. David Lat, Federal Judicial Nominations: A Quick Recap, ABOVE THE LAW (Aug. 18, 2017), 
https://abovethelaw.com/2017/08/federal-judicial-nominations-a-quick-recap.  
 76. Id.; Kim, supra note 74; see also supra notes 33, 68.  
 77. The senators first suggested the third be mutually agreeable but substituted Collins to increase 
the offer’s appeal. The initial White House decision to not renominate the three California October 
nominees apparently reflected ongoing negotiations between it and the senators, which the conservative 
media onslaught extinguished. See supra note 68; see also Letter from Sens. Feinstein and Harris to Pat 
Cipollone, White House Counsel, Nov. 19, 2018; Emily Cadei, Trump Will Have to Nominate 9th Circuit 
Judges All Over Again in 2019, SACRAMENTO BEE (Dec. 28, 2018), https://www.sacbee.com/latest-
news/article223580900.html; supra notes 33, 57, 67, 73, 75.  
  The committee scheduled a March 13 hearing for Collins and Lee, despite the California 
senators’ powerful opposition and retention of blue slips. S. Judiciary Comm., Hearing on Nominees 
(Mar. 13, 2019); Press Release, Feinstein and Harris: Kenneth Lee Nomination Hearing Should Not Move 
Forward (Mar. 4, 2019); Marianne Levine, Trump Judicial Pick Facing Scrutiny Over Extreme Views in 
Past Writings, POLITICO (Mar. 3, 2019), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/03/04/kenneth-lee-9th-
circuit-1202707; But see Editorial, Kenneth Kiyul Lee’s White Privilege, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 5, 2019), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/kenneth-kiyul-lees-white-privilege-11551741146; Senators Feinstein and 
Harris also opposed, and retained blue slips on, Bress partly because the nominee lacks California ties. S. 
Judiciary Comm., Exec. Business Mtg. (Mar. 7, 2019); Press Release, Feinstein Speaks on Blue Slips, 
Ninth Circuit Nominees (Mar. 7, 2019); Michael Macagnone, Trump Ninth Circ. Pick’s Lack of Calif. 
Ties May Imperil Chances, LAW360 (Mar. 7, 2019, 
https://www.law360.com/legalindustry/articles/1136369?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_cam
paign=section.  
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when senators oppose them for “political or ideological” reasons.78 This 
altered the construct which both parties applied during Obama’s years, the 
most recent similar precedent,79 especially as the Chair modestly supported 
placing in himself much discretion to decide if the White House “adequately 
consulted.”80 Most pertinent was resolution of the dispute between the 
executive and the Oregon lawmakers.81 Grassley had not forced the issue by 
denying the slips effect. He conferred with the politicians and seemingly 
recognized that Counsel minimally consulted, because Grassley delayed a 
hearing while the senators tendered candidates whom their panel suggested 
but ultimately acceded by convening a hearing.82 He urged that slips are 
intended to ensure Presidents consult and protect home state prerogatives in 
the selection process.83 
The Chair also changed many panel hearing rules and conventions. 
Integral was arranging ten sessions for two circuit nominees without the 
minority’s permission and the Ninth Circuit one during a recess for 
campaigning; ten hearings acutely contrast to Democratic use of three 
sessions in Obama’s eight years which the GOP had clearly allowed.84 
Circuit hearings were rushed, and they lacked care for nominees who may 
be life-tenured appointees on courts of last resort.85 Some appeared to 
intentionally stall by reiterating questions, and they evasively answered 
queries.86 
 
 78. 163 CONG. REC. S7,174 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 2017); S. Judiciary Comm., Hearing on Nominees 
(Nov. 29, 2017); Letter from Sen. Chuck Grassley to Sens. Patty Murray & Maria Cantwell, Oct. 18, 
2018. But see Letter from Sen. Murray to Sen. Grassley, Oct. 22, 2018. 
 79. Grassley honored this Obama’s last two years; Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) did the first six. See Mtg., 
supra note 11. 
 80. Id.; S. Judiciary Comm., Hearing on Nominees (June 6, 2018) (hearing when Sen. Casey kept 
slip); S. Judiciary Comm., Hearing on Nominees (Oct. 10, 2018) (same for Sen. Brown); S. Judiciary 
Comm., Hearing on Nominees (Oct. 24, 2018) (same for Sens. Murray & Cantwell); see supra note 78; 
164 CONG. REC. S2,607 (daily ed. May 10, 2018). 
       82      Maxine Bernstein, Oregon U.S. Senators Say Federal Prosecutor Ryan Bounds Unsuitable for 
9th Circuit, OREGONIAN (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.oregonlive.com/portland/2018/02/oregons 
_us_senators_say_federa.html; Jimmy Hoover, 9th Circ. Pick Forces Grassley to Choose: Trump or 
Tradition?, LAW360 (Mar. 29, 2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/1025855. For further discussion 
see supra note 61. 
 82. S. Judiciary Comm., Hearing on Nominees (May 9, 2018); see also Bernstein, supra note 81 
(analyzing the four picks, including Bounds, the panel recommended and senators’ reasons for continuing 
to oppose Bounds). For further discussion see supra notes 13–15, 61. 
 83. See supra notes 13–15. 
 84. E.g., S. Judiciary Comm., Hearing on Nominees (Oct. 10, 24, 2018); S. Judiciary Comm., 
Hearing on Nominees (Oct. 17, 2018) (this and second hearing held in recess); Carl Tobias, Filling the 
Fourth Circuit Vacancies, 89 N.C. L. REV. 2161, 2174–76 (2011) (Obama example). 
 85. Feinstein statement, supra note 63; Leahy statement, supra note 63.  
 86. Judge Ho did not discuss his DOJ torture advice, which DOJ did not disclose, and Judge Don 
Willett dodged many queries. S. Judiciary Comm., Hearing on Nominees (Nov. 15, 2017); see also Leahy 
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Many discussions before panel votes similarly lacked content. 
Legislators rarely engaged on issues about core judicial qualifications. One 
pernicious deviation was setting hearings, and even votes, before the ABA 
finished ratings, despite Feinstein’s importuning to have ballots after 
rankings’ completion. Grassley strenuously asserted that this exogenous 
political group must not drive scheduling.87 It was predictable, therefore, that 
controversial aspirants would secure party-line votes.88 
These phenomena did not affect the Hawaii vacancy, as McGahn fully 
consulted the senators about Bennett which prompted their support and rapid 
chamber analysis.89 However, the Chair’s determination to not honor the 
Wyden and Merkley blue slips meant that he processed Bounds, thus 
undermining slips’ purpose, although when Senator Tim Scott (R-S.C.) 
raised concerns over his deleterious writings about diversity and people of 
color, Trump summarily withdrew Bounds.90 
After the committee reported nominees, analogous, yet less 
problematic, dynamics frustrated effective canvasses: Both parties forced 
cloture and roll call ballots on most nominees; members voted in lockstep; 
and the nuclear option’s 2013 explosion permitted selections to win 
confirmation on majority ballots.91 Problematic was compressing six 2018 
appellate nominees’ chamber action into one week;92 this left the minority 
with deficient resources for preparing.93 The quality of Senate debates 
 
Statement, supra note 63.  
 87. S. Judiciary Comm., Exec. Business Mtg. (June 14, 2018); Patrick Gregory, ABA Rates Picks 
Not Qualified, BLOOMBERGLAW (Sept. 17, 2018), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/trump-
picks-more-not-qualified-judges-1; Statements, supra note 63 (ABA input’s value); see also supra notes 
57–58 (external group).  
 88. For committee approval and Senate confirmation of Judge Michael Brennan, see S. Judiciary 
Comm., Exec. Business Mtg. (Feb. 15, 2018), supra note 11; 164 CONG. REC. S2,607 (daily ed. May 10, 
2018); supra note 64 (same for Grasz).  
 89. S. Judiciary Comm., Exec. Business Mtg. (May 10, 2018); 164 CONG. REC. S4,858 (daily ed. 
July 10, 2018); see also supra note 62; David Lat, President Trump’s Eleventh Wave of Judicial 
Nominees, ABOVE THE LAW ( Feb. 23, 2018), https://abovethelaw.com/2018/02/president-trumps-
eleventh-wave-of-judicial-nominees.  
 90. The members failed to discuss Bounds before voting. S. Judiciary Comm., Exec. Business Mtg. 
(June 7, 2018); 164 CONG. REC. S5,098 (daily ed. July 19, 2018) (nomination’s withdrawal); see also 
supra notes 61, 82. 
 91. See sources cited supra notes 17–18, 22–23, 89. 
 92. U.S. SENATE DEMOCRATS, Schedule for May 7, Apr. 26, 2018. Bush and Obama never 
approved so many.  Judicial Vacancy List for December 2017, U.S. CTS, https://www.uscourts.gov 
/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies/2017/12/vacancies (last visited Feb. 18, 
2019); Judicial Vacancy List for December 2018, U.S. CTS, https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-
judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies/2018/12/vacancies  (last visited Feb. 18, 2019); 
supra note 6 (Bush); see the judicial vacancy list from 2009 to 2017 for Obama.  
 93. 2017 notice on four came Thursday evening as senators recessed. S. Judiciary Comm., Exec. 
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resembled numerous panel discussions,94 while many of the thirty hours 
reserved for debate after cloture examined questions lacking relationships to 
individual nominees.95 
The GOP Senate majority, like Trump, prioritized seating appellate, 
over district, judges, nominees in states with Republican senators, 
conservative white males, and filling non-emergency openings, ideas which 
mostly derived from the nomination regime.96 Those facets allowed Trump 
to set appellate records yet left twenty-plus 2017 district picks without floor 
votes, while few realized approval in states with two Democrats, only two 
minority nominees won confirmation and emergencies soared.97 McGahn 
neglected blue state Ninth Circuit vacancies, especially in California. 
Negligible consultation delayed the Oregon effort, and Trump’s deteriorated 
relations with Republican Senators John McCain, who died, and Jeff Flake, 
who eschewed reelection, slowed the Arizona nomination.98 
IV. REASONS FOR AND IMPLICATIONS OF PROBLEMATIC 
SELECTION 
The reasons for selection problems are complex,99 but some 
commentators trace the “confirmation wars” to Judge Bork.100 The process 
 
Business Mtg. (Nov. 2, 2017); U.S. SENATE DEMOCRATS, Schedule for Oct. 31, Oct. 26, 2017. 
 94. See supra notes 88–89. 
 95. When senators address nominees, few members hear them. GOP senators find the thirty-hour 
post-cloture rule so unhelpful they urge limiting it. S. Rules Comm., Hearing on S. Res. 355 (Dec. 19, 
2017); S. Rules Comm., Hearing on S. Res. 355, (Apr. 25, 2018) (approving resolution); S. Rules Comm., 
Exec. Business Mtg. (Feb. 13, 2019) (approving S. Res. 50); Burgess Everett & Marianne Levine, 
McConnell Preps New Nuclear Option to Speed Trump Judges, POLITICO (Mar. 5, 2019), 
https://www.politico.com/story/2019/03/06/trump-mcconnell-judges-1205722; Carl Hulse, Ghost of 
Garland Lurks as GOP Brandishes Nuclear Option Again, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2019, at A14, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/20/us/politics/senate-nuclear-option-trump.html.   
 96. See sources cited supra notes 55–62, 65–71.  
 97. U.S. SENATE, Exec. Calendar, Dec. 23, 2017; see id., Dec. 31, 2018 (31 awaited floor votes); 
Judicial Vacancy List for March 2019, U.S. CTS, https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-
vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies/2019/03/vacancies  (last visited Mar. 11, 2019) (129 district 
openings); Judicial Emergency List for March 2019, U.S. CTS, https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-
judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies/2019/03 
/emergencies(87); see supra notes 23–24, 68, 92, 97 and accompanying text. 
 98. Lat (Part 2), supra note 73; Robert McFadden, John McCain Dies, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2018, 
at A18; Oct. 24 Hearing, supra note 80 (Arizona & Washington resolution); see supra notes 33, 61, 72–
78, 82–83. But see supra notes 62, 90; 164 CONG. REC. S6,883 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 2018) (Ryan Nelson’s 
confirmation, so Idaho resembles Hawaii). 
 99. Compare Michael Gerhardt & Michael Stein, The Politics of Early Justice, 100 IOWA L. REV. 
551 (2014), with Orrin Hatch, The Constitution as Playbook for Judicial Selection, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 1035 (2009). 
 100. Hugh Hewitt, Supreme Court 30 Years War Is Over, WASH. POST (Oct. 22, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-supreme-courts-30-years-war-is-finally-over/2018/10 
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has unraveled, as seen with constant partisanship and striking divisiveness—
manifested in slowing Kavanaugh and denying Garland review, exploding 
nuclear options to confirm Gorsuch and Obama nominees whom 
Republicans blocked and demanding cloture and roll call votes for most 
nominees.101 
The effects are crucial. The 2015 to 2016 inaction and Trump’s 
deficiencies leave eight circuit, and eighty-seven emergency, vacancies, 
many in the Ninth.102 Circuits had “few” empty slots at 2014’s close only 
after Democrats mustered the nuclear option.103 However, 2015 to 2016 
inactivity and judges’ later departures multiplied Ninth Circuit emergencies; 
California lacked nominees for three until October 2018 while Trump has 
approved merely three Ninth Circuit jurists.104 Slow appointments deprive 
the court of judicial resources to deliver myriad litigants justice.105 Few 
circuits address conditions so daunting as the Ninth that resolves immense 
filings most slowly.106 
In sum, this canvass elucidates the appellate process’ state, which 
inattention to California worsened, and the need for speedy action. The 
Constitution grants the executive and chamber many appointments duties. 
Clear precedent that supports approvals near a presidency’s institution 
should govern.107 The parties, thus, ought to cooperate and fill the California 
emergencies. 
 
/22/c443d566-d62d-11e8-aeb7-ddcad4a0a54e_story.html;  see supra note 12.  
 101. The latest began with stalling claims at the end of Bush’s time. The GOP retaliated with huge 
delay in approving Obama’s nominees. Democrats then used the nuclear option. The GOP next slowed 
all nominees. See sources cited supra notes 11, 13, 53, 92. 
 102. Wheeler, supra note 20; see also supra notes 66, 98. 
 103. See supra notes 23–24, 92 and accompanying text. 
 104. Hulse, supra note 74. For more, review the U.S. Court’s website and their archive of judicial 
vacancies.  
 105. JOHN ROBERTS, YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 7–8 (2010); Tobias, supra 
note 13, at 2253; Jennifer Bendery, Federal Judges Burned Out, Overworked, and Wondering Where 
Congress Is, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 30, 2015), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/judge-federal-
courts-vacancies_us_55d77721e4b0a40aa3aaf14b.  
 106. JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S. COURTS, Courts of Appeals - Median Times for Merits 
Terminations in 12 Months Ending Sept. 30, 2017, Tbl. B-4 (2017); Kimberly Robinson, Heavy Caseload 
Creates 9th Circuit’s Bad Rap, BLOOMBERGLAW (May 3, 2018), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-
law-week/heavy-caseload-to-blame-for-ninth-circuits-bad-rap?context=article-related.  
 107. Approval is easier at a presidency’s outset, but the duties always apply. See supra notes 30–
32. 
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V. SUGGESTIONS FOR FILLING THE VACANCIES 
A. GENERAL SUGGESTIONS 
Trump’s major task remains creating an effective government. 
Confirming Gorsuch and Kavanaugh consumed resources that would have 
been dedicated to circuits.108 Trump’s nominal familiarity with judges and 
selection may explain the California vacancies, but his presidency is rather 
nascent and ideas may be derived from efforts thus far.109 
Some behavior inspires little confidence. Trump’s degrading remarks 
on jurists and their decisions 110 suggest that he confronts more appointments 
problems than other new executives but may rectify the situation. Because 
crafting the government and confirming two Justices devoured resources and 
Trump gave California nominal priority, he must emphasize it.111 
Trump needed to avidly consult the senators. Cultivation helps in states 
with two opposition lawmakers, as they could delay processing by retaining 
slips.112 The Oregon stalemate manifested the perils of not consulting, while 
smooth Hawaii approval showed the benefits.113 Trump ought to have 
cultivated the Californians, who cooperated and supplied fine, consensus 
 
 108. Adam Liptak, Gorsuch Clinched Spot After Long Process, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2017, at A15; 
see also supra note 54. 
 109. He seated many circuit judges who may be too new, and too little hard data exist to posit 
definitive conclusions. Jasmine Lee, Trump Could Flip the Supreme Court. His Impact on the Lower 
Courts Is Less Clear, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/09 
/04/us/politics/trump-federal-judge-appointments.html.  But see Alison Frankel, Trump Appellate Judges 
Are Paving the Way to Challenge Precedent, REUTERS (Oct. 3, 2018), https://www.reuters.com 
/article/us-otc-courtingchange/trump-appellate-judges-are-paving-the-way-to-challenge-precedent-
idUSKCN1MD2RD. See generally  PEOPLE FOR THE AMERICAN WAY, CONFIRMED JUDGES, CONFIRMED 
FEARS (2019).  
 110. David Cole, ‘So-Called Judges’ Trump Trump, WASH. POST (Feb. 10, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/so-called-judges-trump-trump/2017/02/10/573fd1c8-ef42-
11e6-b4ff-ac2cf509efe5_story.html.  But see Hawaii v. Trump, 438 S. Ct. 923 (2018). He might ignite 
unproductive circuit-splitting efforts. Transcript of Trump Press Confer., N.Y. TIMES (Feb 16, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/16/us/politics/donald-trump-press-conference-transcript.html; see 
Cadei, supra note 33; Bob Egelko, Trump May Reopen 9th Circuit Split Debates, S.F. CHRON. (Feb. 18, 
2017), https://www.sfgate.com/nation/article/Trump-attack-may-reopen-debate-on-splitting-Ninth-
10943304.php.   
 111. Emergencies reflect conservative work and case load estimates and vacancy length; they show 
California needs priority. Emergencies, Judicial Emergency Definition, U.S. CTS 
https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/judicial-emergencies/judicial-
emergency-definition  (last visited Feb. 18, 2019).  
 112. Kim, supra note 75; see supra note 66 (finding that presidents and senators deem circuits 
critical). But see supra notes 80–84 (finding Judiciary Chair Grassley eroded blue slips’ protection 
regarding seven nominees by processing them without home state senators’ slips). 
 113. See sources cited supra notes 61–62, 82-–3, 90-91 (two states); supra note 11 (Bush’s effective 
consultation).  
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suggestions.114 
The chief executive should also keep applying earlier Presidents’ salient 
practices. When appointing circuit judges, one would be nominating federal 
district judges and state Supreme Court jurists.115 Related is renominating 
and easily confirming able, centrist Obama nominees who almost captured 
appointment, namely Judge Koh.116 The ideas are constructive, as the 
chamber has already carefully evaluated and confirmed federal jurists.117 
Many state justices’ activities resemble those of federal circuit judges.118 
Other promising sources are dynamic federal court litigators.119 
Republican and Democratic Presidents afford White House Counsel 
abundant responsibility for circuit court nominees.120 Trump assigns many 
courts preference yet accorded California little and excluded the ABA.121 
Thus, he should assure California priority, ABA input, and designee 
canvassing that is more careful. Lawmakers’ sending a few picks and swift, 
open communications permitted Trump and the senators flexibility. If each 
persistently rejects all his choices, they should reconcile prolonged 
differences, as chronic opposition imposes delay, cost and the need to restart 
consideration.122 
After nomination, the parties must ensure efficient, intensive and fair 
confirmation systems. Republicans and Democrats ought to astutely 
conclude scrutiny by expediting panel, ABA and FBI checks, and nominees 
 
 114. The California senators ranked and explained preferences. See supra note 68 and infra note 
140.  
 115. Examples are Thapar, his first confirmee, and Joan Larsen, another early circuit appointee. 
Elisha Savchak et al., Taking It to the Next Level: The Elevation of District Judges to the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals, 50 AM. J. POL. SCI. 478 (2006); Tobias, supra note 13, at 2243–46; supra note 71 (Thapar); 163 
CONG. REC. S6,944 (daily ed. Nov. 1, 2017) (Larsen).  
 116. This saves time used to restart selection, cultivates relationships with Democrats and rapidly 
fills California seats. See supra notes 32–53 (California senators favor Koh); Lat (Part 2), supra note 73 
(affiliations); see also supra note 67 (nominating Collins and Lee to the Ninth Circuit and Rosen to the 
Central District); infra note 130 (discussing Obama nominees whom Trump renominated). 
 117. Obama and Trump seated many with full records, expediting review. See, e.g., supra note 19 
(Murguia); supra note 115 (Thapar).  
 118. Obama and Trump appointed many. See, e.g., supra note 21 (Hurwitz); supra note 115 
(Larsen). 
 119. Obama and Trump confirmed many. See, e.g., supra note 21 (Watford); supra note 23 
(Friedland); supra note 64 (Grasz); see supra note 75; Maura Dolan, They Dismissed Her as a 
Lightweight, L.A. TIMES (May 28, 2017), https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-chief-justice-
20170528-story.html.   
 120. Goldman et al., supra note 13, at 14–16; Tobias, supra note 13, at 2239; see also supra notes 
56–59. 
 121. See supra notes 63–64, 78 and accompanying text (rating 6 not qualified).  
 122. This may occur, devouring resources, and suggests why picking and ranking a few is preferable 
to sending one. 
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should help by fully completing questionnaires.123 Senators may retain slips, 
if nominees are unacceptable after they exhaust initiatives to have Trump 
change aspirants’ path, elements which California senators are pursuing. The 
core is merit: independence, ethics, intelligence, diligence and 
temperament.124 When the White House renominated Collins and Lee and 
nominated Bress for the Ninth Circuit, the California senators urged Senator 
Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.), who replaced Grassley as Judiciary Chair, to 
honor their blue slips.125 However, Graham stated that “once (Democrats) 
changed the rules on circuit courts—they did it, not me—to expect that the 
blue slip system would survive is pretty naïve,” refused to respect the 
senators’ blue slips126—and observed that he was “very supportive of the 
nominees submitted by President Trump to serve on the Ninth Circuit” 
because they are “highly qualified nominees.”127 
Once lawmakers provide slips for qualified nominees, the panel must 
swiftly convene hearings. Despite when they are fine centrists and nominees’ 
ABA, FBI, and committee reviews are probing and strong, yielding 
untroubling conclusions, few members attend sessions that proceed well.128 
Should controversy arise, hearings ought to feature robust, comprehensive 
and equitable questioning. Senators pose written queries, which nominees 
carefully answer, while holding meetings to discuss them and vote. If the 
panel approves, but the majority refuses chamber ballots, designee advocates 
file cloture that able, mainstream nominees win.129 The Majority Leader then 
stages floor debates, which must be complete, rigorous discussions that 
respect nominees and the process, and conducts fast votes. 
B. SPECIFIC VACANCIES 
Trump should have assiduously consulted Feinstein and Harris, who 
 
 123. Certain nominees ignored some questions or omitted critical matters. See supra note 121 (Jeff 
Mateer & Brett Talley); Hearing, supra note 62 (Wendy Vitter); Hearing, supra note 82 (Bounds).  
 124. Senators must insure that nominees possess (1) mainstream perspectives, (2) ample respect for 
Supreme Court precedent and legitimate federal or state conduct and (3) no prejudgments on relevant 
issues.  
 125. Emily Cadei, Showdown Looms Over Trump’s Picks for 9th Circuit Court, SACRAMENTO BEE 
(Jan. 31, 2019), https://www.sacbee.com/latest-news/article225349515.html; see also supra note 68. 
 126. Cadei, supra note 126.  
 127. Patrick Gregory, New Trump Appeals Nominee Kirkland Partner, Ex-Scalia Clerk, 
BLOOMBERGLAW (Jan. 31, 2019), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/new-trump-appeals-
nominee-kirkland-partner-ex-scalia-clerk-3; Niels Lesniewski, Debate Over Ninth Circuit Seats Is Latest 
Battle in Trump-Senate Judicial Wars, ROLL CALL (Jan. 31, 2019), https://www.rollcall.com 
/news/congress/debate-ninth-circuit-seats-latest-round-judical-wars.  
 128. Restrepo’s hearing was typical. Some members posed mundane queries he easily fielded. 
Tobias, supra note 28, at 45–46.  
 129. E.g., Tobias, supra note 13, at 2244–46; see supra notes 23, 50–52.  
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cooperated by proffering multiple able, consensus designees for every 
opening. The senators asked him to rename Judge Koh, who achieved 
February 2016 nomination.130 Promptly filling all vacancies is compelling 
for myriad litigants, jurists, and California active circuit judge 
representation. 
Trump ought to have assessed renaming Koh,131 because she deserved 
a 2016 final vote which GOP obstruction prevented, but Koh would now 
have to secure only that and a panel ballot. The last idea shows why she 
merits selection and approval: California needs three jurists, the panel, ABA 
and FBI recently scrutinized Koh fully and their prior surveys necessitate 
mere updating. Precedent sustains that effort. Koh warrants no hearing, as 
Grassley mandated none for the many Obama district nominees Trump 
renamed, yet members who opposed Koh earlier and newer colleagues might 
favor a hearing.132 
California requires each vacancy filled, so the politicians agreed on a 
few candidates they support, but the President named others, despite the 
endeavors of the senators, who pointedly retain blue slips. They must keep 
slips, which the Chair needs to honor. During October, the senators proposed 
Collins, Rogan, and Koh, who merit Trump’s serious review, as they would 
promote quick, smooth confirmation, which fills half the circuit vacancies 
with one nominee he tapped, another on the White House list, who is an 
experienced jurist, and a third who is on the senators’ list and is a respected 
federal judge.133  
Because Trump may reject the senators’ deal and needs multiple 
nominees, Feinstein and Harris might assemble other prospects. One source 
is the twenty-plus Obama California district appointees—most have been 
superb jurists across years. For instance, Central District Judge Dolly Gee 
affords ethnic, and rare experiential, diversity, from prodigious work on 
 
 130. Tobias, supra note 32, at 450 n.1. When senators concur on a single choice, Trump may want 
to defer, as they know more strong aspirants who best represent California and can slow review by 
keeping slips. 
 131. The senators favor Koh. See supra note 33. I rely below on Tobias, supra note 32.  
 132. The sixteen nominees had 2016 panel approval; nine have won confirmation. Carl Tobias, 
Recalibrating Judicial Renominations in the Trump Administration, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 9 
(2017); see also supra notes 45–49. But see Jan. 22 & Jan. 30, 2018 Notices of Intent, supra note 68 
(excluding five Obama district nominees whom Trump had renominated). The Chair should poll 
members; if some prefer another session, he should arrange that.  
 133. The White House was apparently considering this possibility, as the President did not include 
any of the three October nominees in the January 22 package of fifty renominees, although the White 
House did include the three in the January 30 package of nominees. See supra notes 68, 78. But see supra 
note 67; Letter, supra note 78.  
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labor issues.134 Twenty-one Bush confirmees have served well over more 
than a decade. For example, Gee’s colleague, Andrew Guilford, would 
impart expertise from dozens of years being a revered civil litigator and 
federal jurist.135 
The California Supreme Court is another possibility. Justices Goodwin 
Liu and Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar were groundbreaking law faculty, while 
Justice Leondra Kruger practiced at the U.S. Solicitor General’s Office.136 
Trump could also prefer more conservative aspirants, notably Chief Justice 
Toni Cantil-Sakauye.137 Active federal court litigators would be apt sources. 
For instance, Obama confirmees Paul Watford and Michelle Friedland were 
excellent attorneys with a respected firm.138 Counsel whom Trump or 
Feinstein’s panel assessed were Daniel Bress, Collins, Lee and Jeremy 
Rosen.139 
Once the senators concurred, they proposed several strong prospects for 
each slot to Trump, who should have proffered mutually satisfactory 
nominees.140 The many exceptional California attorneys and three vacancies 
offer much flexibility vis-à-vis ethnic, gender, sexual orientation, ideological 
and experiential diversity. A finely-calibrated analysis of these diversity 
facets and other relevant criteria, namely diligence, intelligence and ethics, 
was merited. 
 
 134. Biographical Directory of Judges, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/JudgesAndJudgeships-
/BiographicalDirectoryOf Judges.aspx (last visited Feb. 27, 2019); Tim Arango, Who Is Dolly Gee?, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/21/us/immigration-judge-executive-order-
trump.html (deftly treating immigration cases). 
 135. Directory, supra note 135; Cadei, supra note 33 (senators proposed him). McGahn assessed 
Bush District Judge James Otero and Judge Rogan. Lat (Part 2), supra note 73; Lat, supra note 76; 
Tillman, supra note 33. 
 136. Each would increase diversity. Bob Egelko, Liu Confirmed to Supreme Court, S.F. CHRON. 
(Aug. 31, 2011), https://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/article/Gov-Brown-s-senior-legal-adviser-wins-
13485312.php; David Siders, Jerry Brown Names Law Professor to California Supreme Court, 
SACRAMENTO BEE (July 22, 2014), https://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/capitol-
alert/article2604510.html; see Maura Dolan, As Brown Ponders Supreme Court Vacancy, Earlier 
Appointee Defies Expectations, L.A. TIMES (June 1, 2018), https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-
ln-kruger-court-20180531-story.html.  
 137. See generally Cadei, supra note 33; Dolan, supra note 120. 
 138. It was Munger, Tolles & Olson where Judge Owens and nominee Lee also worked. Directory, 
supra note 135; see Eighteenth Wave, supra note 67; supra notes 21, 23 (approvals); Cadei, supra note 
33 (senators’ choices). 
 139. Lat (Part 2), supra note 73 (affiliations); see also supra note 67 (nominating Collins and Lee 
to the Ninth Circuit and Rosen to the Central District); supra note 68 (renominating Collins and Lee to 
the Ninth Circuit, Bumatay to the Southern District, and Rosen to the Central District and nominating 
Bress to the Ninth Circuit). 
 140. The senators’ approach can facilitate disputes’ resolution and avoid restarting the process. See 
supra note 122. 
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Because Trump and the senators differ, they could use a more dramatic 
approach: the “bipartisan judiciary,” which a few states’ lawmakers 
employ.141 Members of the party lacking executive control suggest a 
percentage of nominees. Reasoning by analogy, Trump may choose one and 
the senators can propose a second, while he and they might agree on a third. 
A related option is “trades.”142 For example, Trump may nominate one 
stellar, conservative, young aspirant, the politicians might send Koh and the 
third nominee would be a Bush district confirmee whom all favor.143 When 
he and senators concur, they ought to apply efficient, comprehensive and fair 
confirmation processes like those reviewed.144 
CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit addresses least promptly the biggest docket mainly 
because it confronts five emergencies, three affecting California. If President 
Trump, Senators Feinstein and Harris, and the chamber robustly adopt the 
mechanisms scrutinized, they can expeditiously fill these vacancies with 
able, consensus jurists. 
 
 
 141. For more on this idea, see Carl Tobias, Fixing the Federal Judicial Selection Process, 65 
EMORY L. J. ONLINE 2051 (2016); Michael Gerhardt, Judicial Selection as War, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
667, 694 (2003). New York nominees suggest use of a similar regime or perhaps trades. Thirteenth Wave, 
supra note 71; Eighteenth Wave, supra note 67. 
 142. Tobias, supra note 13, at 2260 n.126; see Letter, supra note 33 (suggesting trades); supra note 
77. 
 143. See supra note 142 (Bush appointees Guilford whom the senators proposed and Otero whom 
McGahn interviewed) They must only do this, if the situation is dire. Biden statement, supra note 7 (trades 
are controversial). 
 144. See, e.g., supra notes 79–99, 124–27. 
